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The Defendant/Appellant, Ron Dennis Shepherd, by and through 
counsel, hereby submits this Reply Brief of Appellant in further 
support of his appeal. 
REPLY ARGUMENT 
I. THE TRIAL COURT IMPROPERLY ADMITTED UNRELIABLE 
IDENTIFICATION TESTIMONY BASED UPON A SUGGESTIVE SHOW-
UP PROCEDURE. 
Mr. Shepherd maintains that the trial court committed error 
when it found that the eyewitness identification testimony of Mr. 
Hartman was admissible. Specifically, the trial court stated 
that "clearly that the, this was not the optimum, optimal way to 
make an identification." R. 261:38. Yet, the court went on to 
find that the under the totality of the circumstances, the 
identification was constitutionally permissible. R. 261:39. 
A. Opportunity Of Witness To View Actor During Event. 
1. Length of time and distance. 
In the instant case, Mr. Hartman was only able to view the 
actor's face for a "matter of seconds" at a distance of 6 to 7 
feet. R. 256:87, 88. Based upon his very limited observation, Mr. 
Hartman could only describe the actor as having long, blonde hair 
in a pony-tail. R. 261:8. 
In contrast, in Ramirez, the witness was able to see the 
actor from a few seconds to a minute or longer at a distance of 
approximately 10 feet. State v. Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774, 782 (Utah 
1991) . Yet, in Ramirez, the witness was able to describe the 
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actors' s eyes as being small even though the actor was wearing a 
scarf that covered most of his face. Id. at 782. Here, as noted 
by the Appellee, when the Appellee struck the actor with his 
vehicle, the towel on the actor's head fell off and the actor's 
"face was fully visible". R. 256:85-86. However, even though the 
actor's face was fully visible, Mr. Hartman was not able to 
describe any facial features to the police. R. 261:8. All the 
witness noted was the length, color and style of the actor's 
hair. 
This factor weighs in favor of a finding of unreliability. 
At least in Ramirez, the witness, with a very limited view, was 
able to speak as to a specific facial feature of the actor. That 
is not the situation in the instant case. 
2. Capability To View The Actor's Face. 
Again, in this case, Mr. Hartman had a limited opportunity 
to view the actor's face. Even though the towel covering the 
actor's head became dislodged from his head once he was struck 
with the vehicle, Mr. Hartman did not recall any specifics about 
the actor's face. See R. 261:8. Compared to Ramirez, these 
facts are less favorable and weigh in favor of a finding of 
unreliability. 
3. Lighting. 
In the instant case, the lighting at the time the witness 
first saw the actor is more favorable than that present in the 
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Ramirez case. Nevertheless, the advantageous lighting did not 
assist Mr. Hartman in providing a detailed description of the 
actor who had burglarized his home prior to him being called in 
to make an identification. Given that the lighting was not 
significant in prompting a good description of the actor, this 
factor should be given little, if any, weight in determining 
reliability. 
4. Distractions. 
In the instant case, the witness had two of his children 
with him at the time he observed the actor. The record does 
support the contention that Mr. Hartman7 s children were with him. 
R. 2 56:88. Mr. Hartman believed that the actor was wielding a 
gun and had reached back and pointed it at him and his children. 
R. 2 56:84. In addition, as in .Ramirez, here, there were two 
actors. Mr. Hartman had chased one, but had not caught up with 
him. R. 256:75. As noted in State v. Hollen, 44 P.3d 794, 800 
(Utah 2002), the presence of a second perpetrator may increase 
the distraction level of an eyewitness. 
Like Ramirez, here there were distractions. There were real 
or (as it turned out to be) perceived weapons. This fact coupled 
with the presence of the witness's children makes this factor 
weigh in favor of a finding of unreliability. Moreover, if the 
witness was "focused" as pointed out by the Appellee, he should 
have been able to provide a detailed description of the actor. 
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He did not, all he could say was that the man had long, blonde 
hair in a pony-tail. R. 261:8. 
B. Degree of Attention. 
While Mr. Hartman may have had an unobstructed view of the 
actor after he knocked him off the bicycle with his vehicle, this 
unobstructed view did not result in a detailed description of the 
actor. The only thing that Mr. Hartman could say was that the 
actor had long, blonde hair in a pony-tail. R. 261:8. The fact 
that Mr. Hartman only noticed the actor's hair undermines the 
contention that his attention was not diverted in anyway from 
looking at the actor. Even though Mr. Hartman was aware that his 
home had just bee^ n burglarized and he claimed that he was focused 
on the actor, he could not provide a detailed description to 
police. Still, this factor likely weighs in favor of a finding 
of reliability. 
C. Capacity To Observe. 
In the instant case, there is no question that Mr. Hartman 
was not intoxicated, nor was he impaired by any visual defects. 
R. 256:89. In fact, Mr. Hartman testified that he was rested as 
he had slept quite a bit on the plane. R. 256:89. Nevertheless, 
Mr. Hartman could not remember where he was returning from on the 
airplane that night. R. 256:94. It was after midnight when Mr. 
Hartman arrived at his home. R.256:71. These factors clearly 
weigh in favor of demonstrating that Mr. Hartman was, in fact, 
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fatigued. 
In addition, Mr. Hartman believed that the actor was armed 
with a weapon. R. 256:84. Mr. Hartman's children were present. 
Under these circumstances, as in Ramirez, uit is reasonable to 
assume" that Mr. Hartman experienced a heightened degree of 
stress. State v. Ramirez, 817 P.2d at 783. 
Compared to the circumstances in Ramirez, here, like the 
witness in Ramirez, Mr. Hartman's capacity to observe the actor 
was not perfect. While, neither Mr. Hartman nor his children 
were struck with a weapon, there was a fear that a weapon 
existed. In both instances, the capacity to observe the actor was 
compromised by the circumstances. 
D. Spontaneity, Consistency, and Suggestibility of 
the Identification. 
In the instant case, Mr. Hartman was invited to the police 
station to make an identification within a couple of days 
following the burglary. R. 256:165, 174; R. 261:4. However, in 
the intervening two days, the police did not attempt to secure a 
detailed description from Mr. Hartman. R. 2 61:12, 13-14. Nor did 
the police follow the traditional standards and procedures for 
eyewitness identifications by creating a photo array or arranging 
for a line-up. R. 261:14-16. The real issue in this case is not 
that it was two days after the event when the identification was 
made, but, rather, that the identification was the product of an 
unduly suggestive procedure. As in Ramirez, the most critical 
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factor in this case is the suggestiveness of the procedure. 
State v. Ramirez, 817 P.2d at 784. 
In addition, there is no indication in the record that Mr. 
Hartman's state of mind was impaired and while this weighs in 
favor of reliability, the suggestiveness of the show up procedure 
outweighs Mr. Hartman's lack of impairment. Again, the crux of 
the issue is that the identification was made following an unduly 
suggestive one photo, show up. This blatantly suggestive 
procedure is the most compelling and critical factor in 
determining the reliability of the identification in this case. 
Mr. Hartman was exposed to a belief, stated or not, of 
Detective Winterton that the individual in the one photograph 
shown to Mr. Hartman was in fact the second individual who 
burglarized Mr. Hartman's home. Two days following the burglary, 
Detective Winterton contacted Mr. Hartman and asked him if he 
could "come to the Sheriff's Office to look at a picture." R. 
261:10. Then Detective Winterton "showed him the picture and 
asked him if that looked like the person who he saw on the night 
of the incident." R. 261:10. In fact, Detective Winterton showed 
the one photograph to Mr. Hartman to confirm what he (Detective 
Winterton) believed to be the case based upon the accusation of 
Dustin Ward (a co-defendant), not based upon any description 
provided by the sole eyewitness to the crime. R. 261:20; 132. 
There was no explanation by Detective Winterton that the 
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individual in the photograph may or may not be the burglar or 
that Mr. Hartman did not have to confirm that the man in the 
picture was or was not the man who had burglarized his home. See 
State v. Hubbard, 48 P.3d 953, 963 (Utah 2002). The blatant 
suggestibility of the one photo show up is not changed or erased 
simply by the fact that Detective Winterton believed that it was 
not necessary to secure a description from Mr. Hartman prior to 
showing only one photograph to Mr. Hartman. Even if Detective 
Winterton only wanted to confirm the identity of a suspect based 
upon an accusation of a co-defendant, he should have complied 
with the proper procedures. He did not do so. 
Given all of the facts in this case, under the ''totality of 
the circumstances" the eyewitness identification was not 
reliable. While there may be some factors which present 
themselves more favorably in the instant case than in Ramirez, 
given the very suggestive "show up" procedure, the Court should 
find that the identification was constitutionally unreliable and 
therefore inadmissible. The photo shown to Mr. Hartman was not 
consistent with even the very limited description that had been 
obtained from Mr. Hartman. The photograph was four years old and 
was a person with short hair. R. 261:16. The officer did not 
provide an array and admittedly the officer did not follow proper 
procedure or safeguards. R. 261:15-16. The blatant 
suggestiveness of the eyewitness identification procedure 
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outweighs the other factors in this matter. Therefore, the Court 
should find that the trial court committed error when it admitted 
the eyewitness identification. Whether the facts are sufficient 
to demonstrate reliability is a question of law. State v. 
Ramirez, 817 P.2d at 782. Here, the Court should find that the 
trial court did not correctly determine reliability. 
II. THE DEFENDANT'S TRIAL COUNSEL7 PERFORMANCE WAS 
DEFICIENT AND DID CAUSE PREJUDICE TO THE DEFENDANT. 
In this case, all parties agree that the show-up 
identification procedure was not optimal and was, in fact, 
troubling to the Court. R. 261:21, 26. The victim was shown one 
photograph of an individual accused by a man who confessed to 
burglarizing the home of Mr. Hartman. In addition, the photograph 
was not premised upon a description given to authorities by the 
victim. R. 261:20; R. 132. Given the suspect nature and the 
arguably improper and suggestive photo array, trial counsel for 
Mr. Shepherd asked that he be allowed to retain an expert 
regarding the fallibility of eyewitness testimony. R. 54-63. 
The issue of whether or not the trial court would authorize 
funding for the hiring of an expert on eyewitness testimony was 
addressed at the suppression hearing on April 30, 2003. See R. 
261:31-37. While the trial court did indicate that it assumed 
that it knew who trial counsel would call as an expert witness 
and that the trial court did not believe that his testimony would 
be helpful to the jury, the trial court, nevertheless, gave trial 
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counsel permission to submit the necessary request along with 
supporting documentation. R. 261:33, 35. The trial court told 
trial counsel to designate the expert witness, include the 
curriculum vitae, and a report of the expert's anticipated 
testimony. R. 261:35. The trial court then stated that it would 
make a determination as to whether or not it would authorize the 
expense and/or allow the expert testimony based upon the content 
of the anticipated testimony. R. 261:35-3 6. The Defendant's trial 
counsel informed the court at least twice that he would do as 
requested by the trial court. R. 261:35, 36. However despite 
trial counsel's assurances that the information regarding the 
requested expert would be forthcoming, it was never provided to 
or filed with the Court. Mr. Shepherd maintains that it is trial 
counsel's complete failure to pursue the requested expert 
testimony that constitutes ineffective assistance of counsel. 
In order for Mr. Shepherd to prevail on his claim of 
ineffective assistance of counsel, he must demonstrate "first, 
that counsel rendered a deficient performance that fell below an 
objective standard of reasonable professional judgment, and 
second, that counsel's deficient performance prejudiced the 
defendant." Salt Lake City v. Grotepas, 874 P. 2d 136, 138 (Utah 
App. 1994), reversed 906 P.2d 800 (Utah 1995). ""The benchmark 
for judging any claim of ineffectiveness must be whether 
counsel's conduct so undermined the proper functioning of the 
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adversarial process that the trial court cannot be relied on as 
having produced a just result. '" State v. Tennyson, 850 P.2d 461, 
465 (Utah App. 1993) (quoting Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 
668, 686 (1984)). 
In its Brief of Appellee, the State maintains that Mr. 
Shepherd's trial counsel "might well have chosen not to pursue 
the expert witness for tactical reasons" given the fact that the 
trial court did not seem "particularly receptive" to such expert 
testimony. Brief of Appellee at page 21. In addition, the State 
countenances that the admission by the police officer of a poor 
identification procedure coupled with the Long jury instruction 
should have been enough to satisfy trial counsel. Jd. at 22. See 
State v. Long, 721 P.2d 483, n. 8 (Utah 1986). 
While it may be stated that trial counsel could have made 
such a tactical decision, there is no plausible reason for trial 
counsel to have limited his pursuit of undermining the eyewitness 
identification with only the officer's admission that the 
procedure was suggestive and a jury instruction. If trial counsel 
believed that it would be good enough to do so, he would not have 
asked the trial court for permission to retain an eyewitness 
identification expert in the first place. Given that Mr. Shepherd 
has always maintained his innocence, being able to discredit the 
procedure and the resulting suspect eyewitness identification 
were of significant importance to his defense. Under these 
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circumstances, trial counsel had nothing to lose by providing the 
requested information to the trial court. While it is true that 
the trial court could have rejected Mr. Shepherd's request for 
the expert testimony, the trial court just as likely could have 
allowed the expert testimony. If the trial court rejected the 
expert testimony, then Mr. Shepherd would have been in a position 
no different that he would have been had he not made the request 
at all- However, had the trial court allowed the expert 
testimony, the cumulative effect of the expert testimony, the 
police officer's admission of his mistakes, and the appropriate 
jury instruction could have affected the jury's deliberations and 
the ultimate outcome of the case. Unfortunately, we will never 
know what the trial court would have decided because the trial 
court was never given the opportunity to actually consider the 
issue. Certainly, had the trial court allowed the expert to 
testify, Mr. Shepherd's position regarding the fallibility and 
problems associated with Mr. Hartman's identification may have 
been bolstered. Because there was absolutely no reason for trial 
counsel not to pursue the court's permission to utilize the 
expert witness, his failure to do so was deficient. 
Next, the Appellee contends that even if trial counsel was 
deficient in his performance, Mr. Shepherd was not prejudiced by 
the deficiency as there is no "record evidence that would 
undermine confidence in the jury's verdict." Brief of Appellee at 
-11-
>2-23. Given that Mr. Shepherd's trial counsel did not pursue 
seeking permission to utilize the expert witness testimony, there 
Is no "record evidence" to point to regarding the substance of 
the proposed expert testimony. In fact, trial counsel never even 
[tientioned the name of the eyewitness expert despite the fact that 
the trial court stated that it assumed it knew who it was. R. 
261:33. Under these circumstances, it is not possible to set 
forth the substance of the proposed expert testimony. However, 
given the fact that courts in general are reluctant to allow 
testimony that is uin the nature of a lecture to the jury as to 
how they should judge the evidence", trial counsel and the 
proposed expert could have crafted acceptable and admissible 
testimony to avoid this concern. State v. Butterfield, 27 P.3d 
1133, 1146 (Utah 2001) . And, if trial counsel had followed 
through with providing the testimony to the trial court, the 
Court may have, in its sound discretion, allowed the expert 
testimony, particularly since it too stated that uit had a 
problem with" the suggestiveness of the line-up/show up procedure 
utilized by the police officer in this case. R. 261:26. Thus, it 
cannot be assumed that the trial court would have rejected a 
viable request to allow the expert testimony. 
CONCLUSION AND RELIEF SOUGHT 
Wherefore, Mr. Shepherd requests that the court reverse his 
convictions for one count of burglary, a second degree felony, 
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and theft, a class B misdemeanor, and remand this matter back to 
the trial court for a new trial. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 1 D ~ day of January, 2005. 
J^U 
KimberKT D. Washburn 
Attoimeu for Appe l lan t 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that two (2) true and correct copies of the 
foregoing REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT were served, via first class 
[nail, postage prepaid, upon the following: 
Joanne C. Slotnik, Esq. 
Assistant Attorney General 
Mark L. Shurtleff 
Attorney General 
160 East 300 South, 6th Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
DATED this \V' day of January, 2005. 
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FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF - HEBER COURT 
WASATCH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH 
(RON DENNIS SHEPHERD 
Defendant. 
Plaintiff, 
vs Case No: 021500129 FS 
Suppression Hearing 
JUDGE DONALD J. EYRE 
BE IT REMEMBERED that on Wednesday, the thirtieth day 
of April, two thousand three, the Suppression Hearing in the 
(matter of State of Utah vs Ron Dennis Shepherd was video-taped 
jjbefore the Honorable Judge Donald J. Eyre of the above entitled 
jcourt at the Fourth Judicial Court building, Heber City, Utah. 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
Page 2 
F o r t h e P l a i n t i f f : 
APPEARANCES 
Thomas L. Low 
Attorney at Law 
Wasatch County Attorneys Office 
805 West 100 South 
Heber City, Utah 84032 
For the Defendant: Bruce J. Savage 
Attorney at Law 
1790 Bonanza # B223 
P.O. Box 2520 
Park City, Utah 84060 
PROCEEDINGS 
THE COURT: Okay. Are you ready to proceed on State 
|versus Shepherd, (inaudible) ? 
MR. LOW: Yes, Your Honor. On that matter, Mr. Savage 
ihas advised that he would like to have Sargent Jeff Winterton 
available to perhaps answer some questions. I've secured his 
ipresence here. I don't know if Counsel has questions for him. 
||We do have transcripts finally so. 
MR. SAVAGE: We have the transcripts of the 
individual who made the one photo identification. We continued 
this, we continued this because our concern and a significant 
[[portion of our motion to suppress the eyewitness 
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Page 3 
identification, Your Honor, is that in opposition to the norm, 
[with photo arrays and all the language in the cases that we' ve 
[submitted to you about someone picking out from a photo spread, 
jwe don't have any of that here. So what Mr. Low and I 
piscussed when we were here last time is that he asked us 
whether we felt a record would be made with Officer Winterton 
jas to absolutely with some degree of clarity what happened in 
that. Sort of a stand up and look at the photo thing and 
that's why he's here. 
THE COURT: It's kind of a show up, rather than a, 
rather than with an individual with a photograph. 
MR. LOW: Right. Yes. 
MR. SAVAGE: But it's sort of like the only guy in 
the line up, you know, that's why we need to talk to the 
(inaudible). 
MR. LOW: Put on the stand? 
MR. SAVAGE: Yes. That's what I'm saying. 
MR. LOW: Your Honor, the State would call Sargent 
I Jeff Winterton to the stand. 
THE COURT: Come forward and raise your right hand and 
take an oath. 
JEFF WINTERTON 
Called as a witness by and on behalf of the Plaintiff having 
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jbeen sworn by the clerk of the court was examined and testified 
[as follows: 
DIRECT EXAMINATION 
THE COURT: Have a seat. 
Q 
A 
Q 
A 
And your name is Sargent Jeff Winterton? 
Yes. 
You're employed by Wasatch County Sheriffs Department? 
I am. 
Q. Did you investigate this burglary that occurred out in 
|Midway for which Ron Shepherd stands accused? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Did you testify and support in both his preliminary 
(hearing and also Dustin Moore's preliminary hearing? 
A. That is correct. 
Q. Just to clarify one minor issue for this hearing, an 
important issue, did you at some point present the sole 
eyewitness in this case, the victim Mark Hartman, a photograph 
(of the Defendant? 
A. Yes. I did. 
Q. Okay. Now when you did that, what date did you do 
^Biat? 
A. The twenty-sixth of June. 
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Q. That was within two days of the burglary? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Two days a t t h e time Mr. Hartman saw Mr. Shepherd? 
A. Yes. 
Q. At the time you did that, did you have. 
MR. SAVAGE: (inaudible) to strike that as (inaudible) 
fact not in evidence., Your Honor. That is the purpose of the 
[hearing. 
MR. LOW: I guess (inaudible) that, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Your objection is sustained and it is 
stricken. 
JBY MR. LOW: 
Q. Thank you, Judge. The, now when you do that 
[photograph (inaudible) Mr. Hartman, why did you bring that 
particular photograph to show it to him? 
A. That was the name I was given of the co-defendant in 
the case. 
Q. Who gave you that name? 
A. The Co-Defendant. 
Q- Okay. 
A. Dustin Ward. 
Q. Dustin Ward. Alright. Now when Mr. Ward was 
[arrested, was he arrested here locally? 
A. Yes. He was. 
Q. And where did you show Mr. Hartman this photograph of 
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jMr. Shepherd? 
A. Where was I when i t was shown? 
Q- Yes . 
A. In my office at the Sheriffs Office. 
Q. Okay. And why did you proceed in this manner, just to 
take that one photograph of Dustin Moore and show it to Mr. 
Hartman? I'm sorry, that photograph of Ron Shepherd and show 
it to Mr. Hartman. 
A. Why did I do that? 
Q. Yes. 
A. To try to confirm that that was the person we were 
looking for. I believed he was still possibly in the area 
[because we had secured the vehicle that they had traveled here 
in, that Ron Shepherd or Dustin Ward had stated that they had 
traveled here in. 
Q. Okay. So he identified the vehicle, the truck that 
they traveled here in? 
A. He told me where it was at. Yes. 
Q. And you had secured that truck? 
A. That's correct. 
Q. And the other evidence was that they were on bicycles. 
A. That is correct. 
Q. And. 
MR. SAVAGE: Your Honor, I'm going to continue the 
lobjection t o they. Who's they? I think by insinuation h e ' s 
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[referring. 
THE COURT: Well, there was two bicycles found. 
MR. SAVAGE: Okay. I understand that. All I mean by, 
all I mean by they, Your Honor, is that if he's referring to 
the fact that he's been told that by Mr. Ward that's fine. But 
(he's stating that as if he knows it's Ron Shepherd. And I'm 
just concerned about not making that record. 
THE COURT: The Court understands you. Objection 
sustained. 
MR. SAVAGE: Thank you, Your Honor. 
|BY MR. LOW: 
Q. Where I'm leading to why you suspected Mr. Shepherd or 
the other burglar would still be in the area. The car was 
secured by you. You understood that there were bicycles at the 
two burglars had been riding. 
A. I had the bicycles in the (inaudible). 
Q. You had the bicycles as well? 
A. That's correct. 
Q. Alright. And when Mr. Ward was arrested after the 
pburglary, he was found where? 
A. In the Midway area. 
Q 
A 
Q 
Which is close to where the burglary occurred? 
Within a half a mile. 
Was speed of identification then of this other 
[participant in the burglary important to you? 
PLge8 
1 A. It was. 
2 I  3fiK Did you have a complete description of this burglar 
3 ||froia Mr. Hartman to do a photo lineup? 
4 A. Not a complete description. No. 
5 Q. What did you know? 
6 A. Long hair, thought it was in a pony tail. Blonde 
7 p a i r . 
8 £ . And that was i t . Right? 
9 A. Yes . 
10 Q. Now you have a program up here in the Sheriffs 
11 pepartment that lets you put in, you put in some sufficient 
12 information, it will spit out some photos, lineup photographs 
13 for you to use. Is that correct? 
14 A. That's correct. 
15 -&r Okay. Did you have the information to do that? 
16 A. Could have attempted. 
17 Q- Okay. Had Mark Hartman said anything to you to 
18 describe, strike that. I'm sorry, Judge. How did you obtain 
19 Mr. Shepherd's photograph? 
20 A. From (inaudible) Thacker (inaudible). 
21 Q. You have that photograph with you here today? 
22 A. I do. 
23 Q. Can you b r i n g i t o u t ? 
24 THE COURT: ( i n a u d i b l e ) 
25 IIBY MR. LOW: 
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Q. Was this the same piece of paper that you used? 
A. It is. 
Q. How is it, is it a black and white printout. Is that 
right? 
A. That's correct. 
Q. Got it from a computer screen? 
A. Yes. That's where it come off of. A program called 
(inaudible) Track. 
MR. SAVAGE: Just a minute. I'm seeing this for the 
first time. 
THE COURT: Okay. 
MR. LOW: May I continue, Judge? 
THE COURT: (inaudible) 
1BY MR. LOW: 
Q. I had (inaudible) water on it that spilled on the 
table. Marked as State's Exhibit Number One. You'll notice 
that the paper is folded? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Why does that paper still have those fold marks on it? 
jWhat had you done with this? 
A. I folded it in half because I didn't want Mr. Hartman 
[to know the name on the photo. 
Q. Okay. So Mr. Shepherd's personal information was on 
that same piece of paper? 
A. Yes. 
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Q. So how did you fold it? Demonstrate for The Court. 
A. Fold it over like this. 
Q. (inaudible) like that? 
A. Yes. 
Q. We'd move to admit State's Exhibit Number One. 
THE COURT: Any objection? 
MR. SAVAGE: No. 
THE COURT: It's received. 
[|BY MR. LOW: 
Q. (inaudible) Can you describe specifically what you 
said and did to show this photograph to Mr. Hartman? 
"K. I contacted Mr. Hartman on the phone and asked him if 
fiie could come to the Sheriffs Office to look at a picture. Mr. 
IIHartman said that he could. Mr. Hartman arrived at the 
jSheriffs Office. I showed him the picture and asked him if 
that looked like the person who he saw on the night of the 
17laAe±dent. -ffe-. Hartman's reply to me was he was ninety-five 
18|percent. sure that that was the person. 
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Q. And how long did Mr. Hartman take to make that 
response? 
Jk+ It was immediate. 
:Q. Prior to showing that picture, did you ask Mr. Hartman 
[if he would be able to identify the other burglar? 
A. I did not. 
Q. Did you ask Mr. Hartman, or did you inform Mr. Hartman 
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that the co-defendant or the other burglar had identified this 
|guy as? 
A. I didn't. I did not. 
Q. Did you indicate anything to Mr. Hartman that might 
jhave indicated to him that you believed that this was the other 
[burglar? 
A. No. 
Q. Did you ask Mr. Hartman if he was able to get a good 
[[view of the person he knocked off the bicycle that night? 
A. Mr. Hartman had told me that when he hit the 
individual on the bicycle that the person stood up in front of 
the vehicle that he was in, occupying asd he got a very good 
look at the person. 
Q. Okay. Did you know whether or not Mr. Hartman felt 
[comfortable making an identification? 
MR. SAVAGE: Objection. How could he know about Mr. 
|Hartman' s feelings? 
MR. LOW: It's (inaudible) question at this point, 
Judge. 
THE COURT: Well, answer it yes or no. 
||BY MR. LOW: 
Q. I haven't finished it yet. 
A. Repeat the question? 
Q. Were you aware of whether or not Mr. Hartman felt 
comfortable identifying the person he actually had knocked off 
Page 12 
[the bicycle? 
MR. SAVAGE: Same objection. 
THE COURT: Overruled. 
THE WITNESS: It appeared to me that Mr. Hartman was 
tjconfident in the fact that that' s who the person was. 
!|BY MR. LOW: 
.^_ I/ve asked you, before you showed this picture, did 
8 ftyou talk to Mr. Hartman at all about how good a look he got at 
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the guy that he knocked off the bike? 
A. No. 
Q. Thank you, Judge. 
THE COURT: Mr. Savage, Cross? 
CROSS EXAMINATION 
||BY MR. SAVAGE: 
Q. Officer, you had arrested Mr. Ward how soon after the 
incident? 
A. The morning of, the morning of. 
Q. The morning of the incident? 
A. Yes. 
Q. (inaudible) twenty-four hours. And your contact with 
||Mr. Hartman was how long after that? 
A. With Mr. Hartman? 
Q. With your phone call that happened in (inaudible). 
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A. On the twenty-sixth. Two days after. 
Q. Two days after. During that period of time, you were 
looking for leads and you think that the other defendant may 
lhave been in the area? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Is that what you said? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Okay. When did Mr. Ward tell you that it was Mr. 
|Shepherd? 
A. At the time he was arrested and brought back to the 
Sheriffs Office, an interview was conducted with Mr. Ward at 
that time. 
Q. That morning? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And yet it took you two days to call Mr. Hartman? 
A. I was still in the process of recovering evidence from 
the scene. We had a very large area, trying to recover 
evidence. I had a vehicle that I had located at The Homestead, 
[which we needed to process. A search warrant was secured and 
served on the truck. 
Q. So the answer is yes. It took you two days. 
A. It did. Yes. It did. 
Q. And during the period of time that you were doing all 
these things and I read it (inaudible) but while it was going 
Ion, you were for at least two days aware of the reported 
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i d e n t i t y ( i n a u d i b l e ) . And you d i d n ' t c a l l Mr. Hartman. 
Correct? 
A. I d i d n o t . 
Q. And during those two days, could you have had Agent 
[Thacker do what he did in terms of providing you that 
(photograph and, obviously you could have done that because you 
Idid. 
A. Yes. 
G> And your program, which also would have presented to 
jMr. Hartman a photo array of more than one person, could also 
flhave been accomplished in your department by your agency in 
those two days. Could it have not? 
A. It could have been. Yes. It could have. 
Q_. Are you POST trained? 
A. Yes. I am. 
Q_. And when did you, when was your last training at POST? 
'Police Officer Standard Training. 
A. In nineteen ninety is when I graduated from POST. 
Q. Right. Have you had anything since? Do you go back 
for supplementals or for the same thing that lawyers do? 
A. We have continued training. Yes. We do. 
Q. When is the last time you dealt with identification 
issues? 
A. Very little training in identification issues. I do 
25 fflcnow the process of the lineup. 
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Q. Right. 
A. I'm very well educated in that. And it was my mistake 
that I didn't do that. 
Q. So we do admit here today that showing Mr. Hartman 
then one photo instead of the photo array was a mistake 
(inaudible) ? 
A. It was a mistake, the exact, was not proper procedure 
that I would normally not use. 
Q. And would you then believe that showing him this one 
[photograph, with or without the identification and with or 
jwithout the name that was attached to that nineteen ninety-
eight photograph, could have been unduly suggestive to Mr. 
Hartman? 
A. I do not believe I was suggestive in any way. 
Q. No. I didn't say you were. Wouldn't the process and 
couldn't the process have been unduly suggestive? 
A. I don't believe so (inaudible). 
Q. Then why, Officer, is the correct procedure to do it 
[differently than you did it? If the correct procedure is to 
pave a photo array and you know you didn' t do that and it's a 
[(mistake and you're being honest with The Court now. 
A. Yes. I am. 
Q. I appreciate that. Believe me. As does Mr. Shepherd. 
[There's a better way. 
A. There is a better way. I agree. 
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Q. The reason i t ' s a b e t t e r way i s so t h a t the wrong 
A. Correct . 
Q. And therefore, if you do it the wrong way, you are 
treading closely in the area of having the wrong person picked 
||out. Correct? Isn't that why you don't do it this way? 
A. That is, that is a safeguard put in place. That is 
the reason for the safeguard. 
Q. And you didn't follow that safeguard. Did you? 
A. I did not follow that safeguard. (inaudible) 
Q. Now I come back to my question that if you don't 
follow the safeguard and if it's not done correctly and it' s 
[not done to specs, isn' t the issue that it could very well be 
[unduly suggestive, which is what all those safeguards are 
designed to protect? 
A. Possibly suggestive. Yes. 
Q. Thank you. Now may I see that photograph? This is a 
|nineteen ninety-eight Judith Atherton case, arrest in ninety-
seven . Right? 
A. That's correct. 
Q. Tell me what it is you told Agent Thacker that you 
{{wanted. 
A. I told him I needed a picture of Ron Shepherd. 
Q. (inaudible) that person completely? 
A. Yes. 
I! 
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Q. What was the complete and total physical description 
that was given to you by Mr. Ward? 
A. The blonde hair with the pony tail. 
Q. Ruddy complexion, blonde hair, approximate age. 
A. White, white male. 
Q. White? Anything else? 
A. I'd have to look at my report. 
THE COURT: By Mr. Ward or by Mr. Hartman? 
THE WITNESS: By Mr. Ward. 
MR. LOW: If I could clarify that I think you're 
referring to the co-defendant. 
MR. SAVAGE: I'm discussing what Mr. Ward told him, 
first what Mr. Shepherd would look like. 
MR. LOW: So if I can (inaudible) understand, is Mr. 
[Ward and not Mr. Hartman. 
THE WITNESS: Well, I thought it was Mr. Hartman 
describing to me. 
MR. SAVAGE: Let me apologize. What did Mr. Ward tell 
{you in addition to the name Ron Shepherd? 
A. Ron Shepherd. Is my recollection. 
Q. That was it. 
A. Yes. Yes. 
Q. Okay. And why would Agent Thacker know anything about 
[Ron Shepherd then? Because he only told you the name Ron 
Shepherd, why would you had thought that this even existed? 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
Page 18 
A. I knew, I knew that the name of a Ron Shepherd, who 
jwas white male with blonde hair and an approximate age was what 
I was given by Mr. Ward. 
Q. I understand. Why would you think that Ron Shepherd, 
[white male, blonde hair, has a conviction in Judith Atherton's 
court in the Third District in four or five years ago? What 
gave you that impression? 
A. I would have to recall, there was something, trying to 
refresh my mind, it says that Mr. Ward was a co-defendant in 
the case or why that was, I can't recall right now, Mr. Savage. 
Q. Okay. What did Mr. Hartman then, Mr. Hartman then 
said to you that it was a white male, blondish sort of hair and 
krave him the same age, that's all you had without the 
[photograph. Right? 
A. That is correct. 
Q. Kind of like this guy right here? Same sort of guy? 
[Could be a brother, white hair, ruddy complexion, blonde, same 
age, same size? 
A. Looks. 
Q. Same height. Right? 
A. Looks to be, looks to be a brother. That's correct. 
Q. Looks, looks, looks almost good enough to pass. 
ItDoesn' t it? 
A. Yes. It does. 
Q. Okay. So what did Mr. Hartman tell you then? He 
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i f lpret ty much d e s c r i b e d e i t h e r one o f t h e s e g u y s . Didn' t he? 
A . Yes . 
Q. Now tell me again anything else that Mr. Hartman told 
[(you. Distinguishing scars, anything at all. 
A. Mr. Hartman said that he had knocked the suspect off 
the bike. And that had landed hard on his shoulder and I had 
talked through conversation with I believe Ron's mother, 
iConnie. 
Q. I'm not, I'm talking about. 
A. What. 
Q. Before he hit. 
A. No. He had told me that he had knocked him off his 
[bike and he had landed hard on his shoulder. 
Q. Yes. I'm just talking, and that's, that description 
could have been something, some other injury or something? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Okay. But prior to him identifying this, anything 
|else related to physical characteristics? 
A. Not to my recollection. 
Q. Okay. Where would you like this? (inaudible) I have 
nothing further, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Mr. Low, anything else? 
REDIRECT EXAMINATION 
Page 20 
[|BY MR. LOW: 
Q. J u s t o n e . J u s t t o make s u r e . D i d y o u show t h i s 
• j l p i c t u r e t o Mr. Hartman b a s e d on Mr. Hartman' s d e s c r i p t i o n t o 
fyou? 
A. No. 
Q. ( i n a u d i b l e ) name t h a t Mr. Ward prov ided you? 
A. T h a t ' s c o r r e c t . 
Q. Nothing f u r t h e r . 
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RECROSS EXAMINATION 
|BY MR. SAVAGE: 
Q. Oh, one more thing. You were aware, were you not 
initially, from conversations, since you did bring up 
[conversations with Mr. Shepherd's family, that all of them 
identified or warned you that Mr. Ward had a grudge relating to 
||Mr. Shepherd? Because of. 
A. Over a girl by the name of Trish. 
Q. You knew that? 
A. That's in my report. Yes. 
Q. Right. And still didn't give Mr. Hartman any kind of 
choice of six other people other than the guy that Mr. Ward you 
already knew wanted catched for this. Isn't that correct? 
A. I don't, I don't believe that the information I had 
received from the family members, that was after I had had my 
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[conversation with Mr. Hartman. 
Q. Okay. Thank you. 
MR. LOW: Nothing further, Judge. 
MR. SAVAGE: Nothing further of this Officer. Thank 
[you. 
THE COURT: You may step down. Thank you. 
THE WITNESS: Thank you, Your Honor. 
MR. LOW: May he be excused? 
MR. SAVAGE: Yes. Thank you, Officer. 
THE WITNESS: It's time to go home. 
MR. LOW: Argument, Your Honor? 
THE COURT: Go ahead. 
MR. SAVAGE: Are we arguing the motion or are we 
arguing, what are we arguing? 
THE COURT: You're arguing the motion. 
MR. SAVAGE: Okay. 
MR. LOW: Now, do I proceed first? 
THE COURT: It's his motion. 
MR. SAVAGE: It's my motion but once we've raised it 
to suppress, it' s their burden to show that it wasn' t unduly 
suggestive. 
THE COURT: Okay. Go ahead. 
MR. LOW: (inaudible) , Judge. Your Honor, I think we 
[understand that a photo lineup is preferred procedure, 
(inaudible) The question isn't, was this the optimal way to do 
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it, the question is, is this an admissible way to do it? Upon 
closer look at the evidence, does The Court need this anymore? 
THE COURT: No. 
MR. LOW: Thank you. Is this an admissible way to do 
it? And certainly Counsel could bring up the weaknesses in it 
to the jury down the road. And there are weaknesses there for 
|him to use and The State will have to confront that. 
But as to whether on it's admissible, (inaudible) come in, 
I think the memorandum that provided to The Court, except for 
the fact that I referred to the Manson case repeatedly as the 
[Mason case, other than that one problem, I think it does set 
forth very clearly that this case compares favorably with what 
all the other cases compare themselves to, which is Ramirez. 
[And I think I admit, when you read the Ramirez case and you 
start going through how bad it is, you' re just sure that they 
[are going to exclude this evidence. And then you get to the 
end and The Court says well, it's a close call but we find it 
[admissible. 
And it' s kind of surprising considering how negative they 
[are on the quality of the eyewitness evidence in that case when 
the basis was almost entirely (inaudible) by a scar. All the, 
[all the witnesses, (inaudible) were the eyes. The defendant in 
that case was always crouched in a shadowy area. He was very 
[jprecise as to how long you had a chance to look at him. He had 
a gun pointed at them the whole time that he' s looking at this 
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iguy. And then when, when the shoulder comes around, Mr. 
[Ramirez is chained to a chain link fence. With all the lights 
focused on him and hhp m n s saying hey, we caught this guy. Is 
this he then? That is so suggestive. I was sure that that 
twould be too far below the standard. 
But the Supreme Court held that that is an issue that 
should go to the jury. It's close enough of a call that it 
should go to the jury. That it should meet this, the trial 
[court's standard for letting it in. Every case since then 
compares themselves to Ramirez. I've cited a couple for you. 
lAgain, they've all said well, our facts are better than Ramirez 
jand so ours are also admissible. Now, (inaudible), even though 
it goes under the federal standard, which some they say is more 
lax than The State standard, is because it is so identical to 
this case. 
There is a photo shown where one cop goes and says he has 
la brief little description, he's a black guy, he's tall, he's 
jbig, whatever. 
And based on very loose description, another officer says, 
Ijhey, I think I know who you're talking aibout. I'll bring the 
ipicture. Two days later, he drops a picture off on the 
undercover officer's desk and leaves. The undercover officer 
[arrives at his desk later that day, sees the picture and says, 
that's the guy. 
And that identification, out of court and in court, were 
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{both held admissible by United States Supreme Court. I think 
that's almost exactly what happened here. Within two days, 
there's a photograph. No comment, even Manson at least, at 
least there's an expression by the officer, hey, I think I know 
Jwho that is. Here, we don't even have that. 
Sargent Winterton testified for you that all he said was I 
can come down and look at a picture. He came down and looked 
at a picture. Is this the guy or does he look like the guy? 
[That's it. Nothing else that would lead Mr. Bartman to believe 
that he should support the officer' s suspicion because the 
|officer didn't express any suspicion or any belief on his own. 
I think that that case law indicates that while not 
[optimal, like in Ramirez, that wasn't optimal either, they 
should have arrested him, taken him back to the station, done a 
lineup. Not the best way to do it but it was done. And I 
think that the prosecution in that case probably had to live 
[with some of the defects of that if they' d gone to trial. But 
in this situation I think that The Court should allow it to be 
[admitted, Your Honor. Thank you. 
THE COURT: Mr. Savage? 
MR. SAVAGE: We're arguing about different things. We 
|can talk about somebody had a hat on and therefore he can't 
identify him. Somebody's face was painted blue. That's not 
[what we're talking about here. What we are talking about under 
[Ramirez and under Long and the other cases and the progeny that 
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[we've discussed is that this officer has, at his disposal , a 
system that avoids this problem. He doesn't do it but he has 
the time. He has other photos. He doesn't do it. But he I las 
the time. And what he does then do i s he brings this guy down 
and says here 1.1 is. 
Now you heard hi s own. testimony. He knows, he knows, you 
know he ] mx:n /s , we a 3 1 J mow 1 le knows . He shouldn' t have done 
this. The problem is this, you take a look at even some of 
(inaudible) in thi s case, Supreme Court, it talks about the 
fact this is such a powerful issue that it should not be left 
to the whim of the jury. 
W hat "i .re ha v e 1 le : > .^ . .'r.;t-^- *• art 
of the problem i s thi s, h^ do3sn' i :- anythin:; .bs vruld give 
anyone a chance to say -," * ' . • "' iuae. ±r 
lyou read any of these, they say, they all tal.t abcir, rhctcs, 
[plural, photos. And in fact, I think probabl * :-* ^ V.iuw, 
in Lopez, again, thi s State, thi s Supreme, we ^ ^ : „ .x „ -, at 
they don't have (inaudible) photos. I'm on p:.go ;> "j;. „^ 
ilmemorandum. 
We recognize inherent hazards of this procedure, The 
li teiratin e is i "f *p.l ete , and 1' m just summarizi ng hero , about the 
[unreliability of exactly what happened here. So it says, we 
|c[on/ ^  i e a v e the Defendant who participates in photo 
identification wi thout recourse, a plioto array may be 
scrutinized to determine whether xt is impermissibly 
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suggestive. Photo array. We don't even have that. We don't 
|even have the minimum that they're talking about. 
And if you go down below, in addressing suggestibility, 
[The Court must determine whether witness identification, 
product of suggestion, here's the quote, The Utah Supreme Court 
has given directive, directions, excuse me, to law enforcement 
[officials to present photos. Photos. That's not it. We have 
a guy in the middle of the night, driving an SUV, four children 
if you recall, very emotional, testimony, you know, guy runs 
|out of the house, got a, got a towel on, all this stuff. 
And what you have is a couple days later, the police come 
|down and don't give him a photo array. They don't give him a 
lineup. They don't do anything of the sort and what else could 
they have done except paint blue arrows all around the desk and 
say here's the guy. Right? Okay. I don't think Officer 
[Winterton would do that. I've known him for a long time. 
However, everything they could have done to avoid this 
[problem, to avoid the fact that here they come and we're cops 
and here's the photo, they did none of it. They did absolutely 
none of it. And every case that we've cited to talks about 
multiplicity of choices. They didn't give him a choice. They 
|had, here's the photo. How could it be more suggestive than 
that, Your Honor? I'm sorry. (inaudible) 
THE COURT: I know. I have a problem with it. But 
[how do I get around Ramirez, I mean basically this is a, this 
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jis a show up without the real person. They have a show up with 
|a guy chained, you J ;:now, handcuffed to a chain link fence and 
say is that the guy? Clearly, in the case, in this particular 
(case, Mr. Hartman had a much better opportunity to it least, at 
leas 1;", by h:i. s tes tiniony t o \; i ow t:he i ndi v:i ci!ua "I I:J i,«, i. , 
supposedly the perpetrator of the burglary. And ii i Ramirez, 
the guy had a mask on, mean, you know, a handkerchief or 
(whatever it was. And. 
MR. SAVAGE: And 1, 1 understand (inaudible). The 
(problem that I think that we're hanging here is what did he see 
|when 1 le had a chance to see. And understand our memo doesn't 
t a 1 k a b o u t t h a t I/\I 1 i a t i; i e' r c t a J k :i n g ab o i 11. 
.THE COURT: 1 understand 1 you know, you talk about 
that, that our courts have said that if the police had a better 
way to do it, they have an obligation to do it. Where does it 
say that? 
MR. SAVAGE: No. In our, what I was saying is that as 
|we talk about the Supreme Court, it has given that direction. 
[And 111 e qu o to 11" i a t\ \ J O. q i. v e y o u ,„ 1.11 <«*." S u p r e m e C o u ;i t, i: • c;»r i v e y a n 
jattitude of disinterest, the photographs themselves should net 
pe selected as to give one greater prominence. That's my 
[point. 
THE COURT: Well. 
MR. SAVAGE: That'' s a quote from The Supreme Court 
that uses the word photographs. 
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THE COURT: I know. That's when you're dealing with a 
[photo array. We're not dealing with a photo array here. 
MR. SAVAGE: Right. 
THF. COURT: Clearly, clearly a photo array would have 
[been a lot better. 
MR. SAVAGE: But if might, Okay? I'm going to give 
lyou six photographs right here. Three of them or five of them 
are going to be red-headed, blue-eyed, cross-eyed people and 
now we're going to have a black guy in the middle. Gee, you 
think it's suggestive? Probably. How is that different than 
just giving him the one photograph of the guy that would have 
stuck out here? And my point is that by giving them the one, 
they don't have to have all the other ones for which he could 
absolutely say no. Okay? 
But what we have by them not having the photo array is 
exactly what would have happened in that photo array had the 
other photographs been this poorly matched. Here they didn't 
even go to that extent. So if you have five people who 
couldn't possibly be the guy, he sort of defaults here. If 
that's the case and he defaults to that guy, you would say, 
[wait a minute, that's completely, that's just suggestive and 
that's ridiculous. How is that different, I would ask you, 
than giving him the one photograph and not even bothering with 
the other five? That's why when they talk about photo arrays, 
that's why when they talk about photographs, what they are 
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saying here is that if you're going to give him all of these, 
great pains and let me hold that thought for a second, great 
[pains must be taken not to have one of the six be suggestively 
presented to the, to the eyewitness. How could you not give 
jone person one photograph, if six won't do it, one is 
impossible. So what I'm suggesting to you is that if they had 
given him red-headed, blue-eyed, cross-eyed folks and he says 
well, it's none of those guys, therefore, it's got to be this 
idude. 
How is that different than simply giving him the this dude 
[photograph and not even going through the bother of doing it 
correctly? BTy handing him and saying here he his. Take a 
look. Here's the photo. Okay9 They are suggesting to him. 
They can' t help it because they didn' t do it the way tl . ;;ou 
just heard the Officer say the system is designed not do. 
He did exactly what the system is designed not to do. He did 
exactly, and testified uncontradicted that he knows it's a 
Imistake. •_'';. - ;->. ~.»op::.'. ar. Tr's not c-rect procedure. And 
jhe was t: • . "lor . . ..•-: " said > him, 
[wouldn't that therefore, okay, there's .he issue. ::cv -ould it 
[not be unduly sug^ •«'.'•••• -. .--.' 's 
talking about. 
Now I understand that you're saying you've got the one 
problem if the five wouldn't be him, completely different. You 
would say, wait a minute, this is unduly suggestive. You've 
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[got this guy who doesn't look anything like these dudes. Well, 
here we don't even have these dudes. Here we only have him. 
Therefore, the suggestibility is paramount and I think that 
[what we quote in the cases is, The Court has to take a look at 
that and say, wait a minute. Before we let the jury hear this 
bart, we've got to decide is this a reliable mechanism, the 
procedure that the policeman used. 
I'm not talking about when they had a mask on. I'm not 
talking about whether he's chained to the fence. I'm talking 
about what the policeman did was unduly suggestive. Mr. 
Shepherd can't control that. And no jury instruction, unless 
|moving into our second motion, you're going to let me put 
someone up there who's going to tell them what's wrong with 
what they did, which is our second motion (inaudible). 
JIP CODRT: Well, you're going to get Mr. Winter ton on 
the stand and he's going to acknowledge that it was. 
MR. SAVAGE: Right. 
TSK COURT: Nor a, you know, you've bound him by his 
testimony here. That he didn't follow correct police procedure 
|with respect to identification. What I'm dealing with right 
now is, was, was the way that the identification was made 
[unconstitutionally impermissible? 
MR. SAVAGE: And we submit it is and that's it. I'll 
rest that argument. 
THE COURT: Mr. Low, anything else? 
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iiR. LOW: I'd | ii'-, I- like; Lo comment.., Ycnr Honor, I. hat I 
appreciate Defense Counsel's motion. It's a necessary motion. 
It has to be heard and The Court has to make findings. I 
lappreciate the opportunity to do this. This is clearly not a 
frivolous motion. It is a close call in some ways. '.' si 
like to rebut a little bit. Admittedly, a lineup is always 
[better than a show up but because there is such a thing as a 
lineup doesn't mean that show ups are inadmissible. All these 
cases are show up cases. And so vhila :-hov: ups aren't optimal, 
they are permissible. And otl : •-;•• i-. .- forces •"•11 determine 
[whether or not they would constitutionally admissible. 
Finally, Your Honor, I'd like to point out that the reason 
show ups are so important and Liie way, and the reason they are 
useful and permissible, is because sometimes speed is of the 
jessence. I hear Counsel say two days wasn't that speedy but 
JMr. Winterton thought that maybe the Defendant vras still around 
locally and could be caught before he made it back to Salt 
Lake. And so that's why he did what he did and Counsel will be 
[able to elicit testimony regarding the benefits of a lineup 
|over a show up through my own officer. 
I did not address the expert but I do think I briefed that 
fairly thoroughly. (inaudible) an expert is either going to 
lecture the jury about generic facts or he is going to comment 
on Mr. Hartman's credibility. And either way, it's |ust not 
[appropriate. Now it is of The Court's discretion, you can 
Page 32 
||permit it, but court's generally haven't. And their refusal to 
(do so has been upheld. 
Recently, I do not cite this case because I wasn't aware 
[of it but December thirty-first, (inaudible) State versus 
^jpfaestas, Christine Durham tries to make a defacto rule that 
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there is always the right, if the Defendant requests an 
[eyewitness expert, it's always going to be, it has to be 
allowed. And the other four Justices of the Supreme Court, 
even though she writes the majority opinion, all four of the 
[others descent from that view and say no. 
All of our precedents say it' s up to the trial court and 
they quote some language from Holland and the others case I've 
[provided for The Court indicating usually it' s not or helpful 
jto simply lecture the jury. They have my witness lecture the 
jury and the have The Court lecture the jury. And so I ask The 
|Court to disallow that request as well. 
MR. SAVAGE: And I'll speak to that, if I might? 
THE COURT: Go ahead. 
MR. SAVAGE: I can put a, they will have to obviously, 
fput the Officer on the stand. He stands there and says, Okay. 
I made a mistake. Now I say to him, so what's it mean? He 
says I don't know. Now am I supposed to walk over here and say 
(well, you guys know what it means? No. What's going to happen 
is. 
THE COURT: Before we. 
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.i...\.Gi: :;..;'s going to have a rolling 
reenforcemerr •;,?.'s go.; no to h~v^ a ro!lma re--: .forcement of 
t h a t i d e n t i i i G d u i ' J1.1 , JL i~> i J i i 11_.» i J. i-» i J i c - ;:> v ,j \J IL, J, I y u u 11 ci. v 'c: that same 
sort of thing, because, let's face it, which of us is Mi: 
Shepherd, other than the fact: that you know me, \ riio do yi ",j 
think this is? Who does he think it is? There is an aspect of 
re-identification. 
Our motion talks about both of those. Not onlj what we 
[perceive to be the suggestive, -.-• 's a picture of a guy. But 
[when 1 ii: /- ,;s dowi i ai IC . ... . :• r >>: ..-. u he's prepped 
for the prelim and thxs guy si CLJ.IIC nc:c*. L^ :, a, he knows ~.: s 
[not me. Because?, my 1 , > ' , : , 
[have somebody who can tell them, the impact of v;hat was 
originally occurring and the falsity of the reenforcement and 
|we speak to that second (inaudible) . 
THE COURT: That's why we have, that's why we have the 
long jury instr action. 
MR. SAVAGE: But telling them that. 
^1|§&:T 430ORT: A n d I ] : n o i \i I a s s um e I k n o w w h o y o u \ i o u 1 d 
call. I've heard his testimony probably three or four times. 
[And I, I rea 1 ly don't think his testimony is helpful to a jury. 
MR. SAVAGE: Now, you're, now you/re jumping ahead of 
Ime on my witness list. The point: that I think needs to be 
addressed, ai id y ou may nut .tike it, OkayV But we're entitled 
to have somebody come tell these people, I believe, that xf xn 
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fact, this has happened, this is what it's going to do and here 
are the studies and here' s why and you people need to be 
thinking about that. Because what they're going to hear is, 
this is what's, this is what's going to happen and you know 
it's going to happen. He's going to say I screwed up. He's 
[going to say so what? I'm going to say he screwed up. The 
officer's not going to be able to explain nor will he 
voluntarily explain why retrograde re-analysis will occur. He's 
|not going to volunteer it who am going to put on the stand and 
talk about it (inaudible). 
COURT: Well, you're going to have, you're going 
to have the jury instruction that says that, you know, that you 
should look to eyewitness identification closely. That it's 
reliability is not, you know, not that good. And these are the 
factors you should look at to determine, to determine whether, 
|how good, how good the reliability is. 
MR. SAVAGE: And how will I do that without the 
testimony of someone to tell, let me back out of that for just 
a second. I'm asking for the appointment because you know who 
I want to pay for it. If during the trial I show up with 
someone, are you going to stop them? Are you going to say no, 
he can't testify? That's a different question. We're asking 
(you to appoint somebody so that the County has to pay his 
[witness fees. But if we can show up with somebody and we say, 
this is what we think. This is an expert. We think it's 
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germane, Are you indicating that a motion (inaudible) is going 
to stop our expert from telling us that? Because that' s a 
'whole ilif f eren t i s sue . 
I9E CGOTRT: Well. 
MR. S AVAGE : P. i id I' m i i iti cipating that. 
THE COURT: Clearly, clearly it's within my discretion 
to permit il 
MU. SAVAGE: And 1 understand that. 
THE COtIRT: Pursuant to the ca se law, 
MR , .AVAGE: But if I do do that and list him as an 
expert and if Mr. Shepherd's family, for example, comes up with 
the money to dn 1 bat, a ] right? Par !:: of what \ JO" re doing is I'm 
asking you to appoint somebody and that involves fees. But if 
they want to pay somebody to come in and talk nboiil th.-vl-. ,\md we 
[give them expert notification, then we have a different issue 
(before The Court. 
•vCODRT: What I'm going to do J.n that, on that 
particular issue is I uant you l.o designate who you who you 
:anticipal"p yon wouM nil I i-uinl ymi ID LIK 1 ucle h :i s I:l i =s CV 
land the report and a report as to what he would testify to. 
MR. SAVAGE : Under which, under a ppo t in tine n I! o r 111 ider 
[private or 
3PH3E COURT: Either, either, either one. 
MR. SJ'A-,. ^. < . W e ] 1 do that. 
THE COURT: And then I'll make a determination based 
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lupon, you know, what you anticipate his testimony will be. I 
don't want, I don't want the County to go to undue expense to, 
hfou know, to bring him here and then for me to say, I'm not 
[permitting the testimony. 
MR. SAVAGE: We have (inaudible), a trial, we have 
time to do this. I'm just concerned because of our conference 
lat he bench hearing, I'm not attempting in any way to run up 
jor, you know, to incur fees for them that aren't necessary. 
[And that's why I'm raising it now. If the issue is I'm not 
going to appoint it because I don't think it's necessary that's 
la different standard and level of proof than if we want to 
[bring him on our own. And that's why I'm concerned about that. 
THE COURT: Well, that's why, that's why I want you, 
[with respect to that, I want you to submit the name of the 
individual, his CV, his or her CV, and a report as to what you 
|would anticipate that person would testify to. 
MR. SAVAGE: We'll do that. 
MR. LOW: And that would be, guess, just kind of a 
(inaudible) pro-bono from the expert trying to get business 
|(maybe or something. There won't be any expense on our part for 
that, I take it at this point. 
MR. SAVAGE: To send you somebody's? 
MR. LOW: Okay. Thank you, Judge. 
MR. SAVAGE: Resume? Not unless you want (inaudible). 
MR. LOW: Well, and a report. I. 
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Mk. SAVAGE: Well, if we designate him as an expert, 
see? Then the issue becomes they have the righ 
thoy 11 I'I'I IIus i ujht to go do things as it relates to bnu being 
|an expert. Now we're into fees. Now we're int'o hour] y. But 
if we're gomcj I * • »l>> ill sou, lli.it, LJ:» . I whole different 
(inaudible). 
MR. LOW: I just know, Your Honor, 111*i Iiong 
instr action is two pages or more long, :i t's a horrible 
instruction to The State already. And the burden that we have 
to overcome jus t :i ri , :^ ng instruction, I think is enough to 
help the Defendant. • .* -vv LO pile on expert and then us 
'having a rebu11:a ] expei:t, it' s i:ea] 1 y hi 11ing an issue that is 
already in the Defendant's court. They get a wonderful 
instruction that really hurts The State. 
MR. SAVAGE: My response to that is, \ ?e are i rot the 
ones who did it wrong. Therefore, telling that, tel] i ng i is 
they can' t affoid to face i t is not a good argument. 
We're not the ones vho ci; c :.h.i ° 'Tvey ai^. Because, you 
|know, we wouldn' t * . - ^ . ^iv normal, age 
appropriate, sex appropriate, identification appropriate photos 
Ihad been there. This would not, t'h i «i mot j en m mid ir-l In i » 
•[been f n ."I ed . 
So for them to r>uy well, you don't qet the right- fc oliul 
what our Officer did or talk about how it might inf] uence them 
[because it's too much money is inherently unfair. 
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THE COURT; Well, as to that issue, that's my, let'r 
go to the ruling with respect to the identification by Mr. 
Hartman. I think I've indicated previously that clearly that 
the, this was not the optimum, optimal way to make an 
identification. The Court then must determine whether it falls 
[below a standard which is constitutionally permissible and in 
this case you know, based upon the case law, Mr. Hartman 
clearly had an opportunity to observe this individual, based 
[upon his testimony at preliminary hearing. That he saw him run 
from the house, at that point in time, he had a towel over his 
|head and, and clearly there wouldn't have been any other 
identification if at that point in time, other than just what 
|he was wearing and maybe that he was Caucasian. 
MR. SAVAGE: Color of the bicycle. 
THE COURT: And the bicycle. So he gets in his 
[vehicle. He runs, you know, he goes down and runs the guy, 
[hits the guy and knocks him off his bike. The guy stands in 
front of him in his headlights for a moment and then runs off. 
Curing that; moment In time, Mr. Hartman testified that he 
[{had an opportunity to observe him, had an opportunity to 
2|^observe his physical appearance. Did make, did give the 
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thought it was in a pony tail. But that was about the extent 
of the identification. 
He then, two days later, is shown a photograph. He is 
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not, y on know, "he's not told anything about the photograph, you 
[know, all this other background thai: we're aware of , lhal t 
supposed co-defendant: has identifxi"d him to be the individual, 
|he is not told that the Officer believcas this to be the 
individual. He ju^1 a sk ,r> In in, shows 1 lim a photo and says, let 
|me see what he asks. He asked if that looked like the person 
that he had, that he had seen at hxs hoi ise. 
And Mi: Hartman was not was unequivocal. He said I'm 
Jninety-five percent sure thr -it's the . individua 1. The Coi irt 
finds that given the tsotaj i c. the circumstances, that Mr. 
Hartman's observation to observe, his partial description of 
the individual, the fact that ho wo;.> not,, there was nothing 
told by him, by the Officer to him that this person was <?. 
suspect otherwise. He was jus!: asked if does l:hxs .Look Ixke 
the person you saw. And his immediate identification of that 
individual. 
'.riii': Com I, find:; that given the totality of the 
[circumstances that, that the identification is constitutionally 
(permissible. CI ear'.I.;, r the argument «'.an be made that, you know, 
the problems associated with eyewitness identification and so 
that's the first rule. The Court denies yuiu I"ULIOLI In 
suppress Mr. Hartman's identification of h.i m based upon the 
[photograph submitted by Officer Winterton, Ymi" ie rn.it I>UJ. suxny 
as to I \r, Ramirez's, I mean Mr., what's the guys's name? 
MR. LOW: Ward. 
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THE COURT: Ward's, y e s , i d e n t i f i c a t i o n of Mr. 
Shepherd. Are you? With r e s p e c t to? 
MR. SAVAGE: No. We w e r e n ' t . 
THE COURT: Okay. 
MR. SAVAGE: That wasn't part of our motion. 
THE COURT: Okay. 
MR. SAVAGE: I would like to bring one thing to the 
jCourt's attention, just so that as we get closer, as you can 
tell from the testimony of the Officer, we have people that 
look just like my client and my concern, and I want to give you 
a heads up, that we would certainly propose and plan to have 
[him re-identify this individual without any further help. 
Because even the Officer looks at him and says whoa. He 
didn't say whoa. But he said yes. It could be a brother and 
it's certainly close and he certainly fits the description. So 
|my concern there is relating to, if you take a look, and I'm 
saying that because if you take a look at the nineteen ninety-
[eight photograph and you look at him, that's a whole different 
look. And he weighed significantly more. There's a lot of 
[differences in that photograph. Which is one of the reasons we 
think it was suggestive. Because those photographs show two 
significantly different like people. He's much heavier, 
different face, different facial hair, different everything 
than the arrest time. I'm, I'm concerned that given the 
[paucity of the description, blonde hair, that age. 
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THE COURT: Well, I, you kno< . .VLeacly part of thr , 
jlpart. of the case of the prosecution is to establish identity. 
(And that. 
MR. SAVAGK: (inaudible) pulling something over 
(inaudible). 
THE COURT: No. 
MR. SAVAGE: When you do that. 
THE COURT: No. I, that's .\ that's clearly an .Ls:;ue 
that has to he dealt with at trial. 
MR. SAVAGE: Thank you, Your Honor. I'm just giving 
jyou a heads up that we plan to pursue that. Thank you. 
MR. LOW: Do another line up? Is that what you're 
saying? 
MR. SAVAGE: No. 
THE COURT: No. He's just, he's just indicating that, 
[you know, that he might. 
MR. LOW: That he might pull a stunt. 
THE COURT: Yes. 
MR. SAVAGE: Yes. 
MR. T,OT! (Jr.aMdi.b1'>) 
THE COURT: Okay. Any other matters need to come to 
(my attention? 
MR. SAVAGE: My apologies. 
MR. LOW: Just as a time frame on Counsel because if 
there' s going to be an expert situation, State will need to 
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[[pursue i t a l s o ( inaudib le ) . 
THE COURT: I ' l l g i v e you t e n days n o t i c e t o do t h a t , 
Mr. Low. 
MR. SAVAGE: Okay. We have , w e ' r e , y e s . We're f i n e . 
(Because w e ' r e s t i l l working on the a d d i t i o n a l a l i b i w i t n e s s e s 
land o t h e r i t e m s . 
MR. LOW: Yes. 
MR. SAVAGE: I would like to apologize to The Court, 
[Mr. Low and to The Court, Your Honor for my tardiness. I wish 
it hadn' t happened that way and (inaudible) . 
THE COURT: Well, we understand. 
MR. LOW: And as to alibis, Your Honor, I guess there 
is a statutory requirement (inaudible). 
THE COURT: Yes. There is a statutory requirement 
notice. 
MR. SAVAGE: That's why I just told him. 
MR. LOW: Alright. Thanks. Well, no. (inaudible) 
THE COURT: You have to file. 
MR. SAVAGE: I'm telling you what's coming. I just. 
MR. LOW: Thank you, Judge. 
THE COURT: Okay. We'll be in recess. 
(WHEREUPON THE SUPPRESSION HEARING WAS CONCLUDED.) 
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C E R T I F I C A T E 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
: ss. 
ICOUNTY OF WASATCH ) 
THIS IS TO CERTIFY that the Suppression Hearing was 
electronically recorded and thereafter caused by me, Richard C. 
Tatton, to be transcribed into typewriting to the best of my 
(ability. 
I FURTHER CERTIFY that I am not of kin or otherwise 
associated with any of the parties to said cause of action, and 
that I am not interested in the event thereof. 
WITNESS my hand and official seal at Midway, Utah 
this 18th day of October, 2004. 
I wifcuX £,* 7aJ!f&^> 
RICHARD C. TATTON, CSR, RPR 
(My Commission Expires: 
June 15, 2005 
^ 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
STATE OF UTAH 
My Commisslcr: Excires 
June 15. 2005 
RICHARD C. TATTON 
5CHcnft1slE3st 
Midway, Utah 34049 
